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1. Egalitarianism and responsibility
Much has happened in the theory of distributive justice during the last 30 years, in
the period, roughly,  since Rawls published his magisterial work
1.  As occurs in most fields
following a great contribution, that work has been subjected to critique, amended and
ramified,  so that what Rawls proposed now appears as an early ancestor of contemporary
theories of distributive justice, or equity.   In this paper, I locate what I think is the main
trend in this developing theory, and then to try to apply the theory to the issue of health.
To come quickly to the point, what's largely missing in Rawls's theory of
egalitarianism is an adequate formulation of the role of responsibility.   Rawls did try to
integrate responsibility into this theory, as I shall describe.  But, seen from the developments
of equity theory since Rawls, his effort was only a first groping, and did not fully come to
grips with the issue.
In arguing for equality, Rawls did not advocate the equality of degrees of welfare or
happiness of people, but rather of an input into those welfares, what he called primary social
goods. In so doing, he held individuals responsible for their life plans, in the following
sense: someone who constructs a life-plan requiring great wealth would not receive, at the
bar of Rawlsian justice, more resources than someone who constructs a more modest plan
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1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 19712
in respect of resource use.  In this sense, individuals, in the Rawlsian theory, are held
responsible for their own 'expensive tastes;'  society, that is,  does not compensate them with
more resources should they develop plans of life which are more resource intensive than the
average.  Rawls deems it sufficient to equalize certain inputs into welfare, primary goods.
To put it another way, using the Rawlsian terminology: distributive justice requires
compensating persons only for the disadvantages they suffer due to factors in their
environment which are morally arbitrary.  But Rawls did not hold that a person's life plan
was morally arbitrary, in the sense that being born in Calcutta, or Beverly Hills, is morally
arbitrary.   To have declared that equity required equalizing levels of happiness, where
Rawls defines happiness -- I think correctly -- as the extent to which one's life plan is
realized, would have been to insure people against having chosen ambitious life plans, in the
sense that  egalitarians do  think that a person should be insured against the bad luck of the
birth lottery (e.g., being born handicapped, or to a homeless family in Calcutta).   And why
did Rawls not declare life plans to be morally arbitrary?  Because if a person's life plan were
morally arbitrary, what about him would not be?  And if everything about a person were
morally arbitrary, what grounds would we have for holding him responsible for any aspect
of his behavior or existence, indeed for viewing him as directing his own life?
In 1981, Ronald Dworkin wrote two essays that focussed upon the issue of
responsibility in the theory of distributive justice.
2  Dworkin asked, exactly what is it that
egalitarians should seek to equalize?  He was animated by examples in which people
developed expensive tastes,  or preferences for styles of life,  which required large resource
endowments.  He distinguished between a person's resources, or endowments, and his
ambitions.   Dworkin proposed that the right things to equalize were the resource bundles of
persons, where resources include not just tangible wealth, but the less tangible handicaps
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and talents that people have.  An ethically attractive egalitarianism, however, would not seek
to equalize welfare, or, more precisely, to compensate people for the personal states resulting
from their having differential tastes or ambitions.   It is, however, not obvious how to
equalize a bundle of characteristics (resources) across persons, when some elements of the
bundle cannot be changed (e.g., inborn handicaps and talents).  The question for Dworkin
was: How does one  properly compensate a person for the unfortunate bundle of inalienable
resources she may have, with a transfer of alienable resources, like money?  Dworkin
offered a proposal,  which was not unproblematical, and which my space constraint prevents
me from describing here.  Suffice to say, in Dworkin's proposal, a person was made to bear
the costs of his ambitions.
In 1989, another philosopher, Richard Arneson,  published a new proposal, building
on both Rawls and Dworkin.
3  Arneson said that Rawls and Dworkin had sought to
integrate responsibility into the theory of egalitarianism by equalizing some input into a
person's welfare or happiness -- either primary goods or resources, comprehensively
defined in the Dworkinian manner.  In contrast, Arneson proposed not to equalize some
input, but to move from outcomes to opportunities.  Rather than equalize outcomes (in this
case, welfare or happiness levels), and rather than equalize some list of inputs useful for
achieving outcomes, one should equalize opportunities  for achieving the outcome in
question.
Now one might say that opportunities for successful life-plan achievement are
equalized by equalizing Rawlsian primary goods or Dworkinian resources, but Arneson
argued against that claim.  The idea of equal opportunity is that all people should face sets
of choices which are, in some sense, equivalent, and this, he said, is not captured by
equalizing some list of inputs into welfare. When personal choice sets have thus been
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equalized, the different outcomes which result from individuals' making different choices
from those equivalent sets are of no ethical concern.   Of course, one has to be careful in
deciding when those personal sets of choices are equivalent.   It wouldn't be adequate to say
, for instance, that everyone faces the same set of choices if there is no discrimination in
hiring and public education is available to all.  We all know that that kind of formal
equivalence does not make the choices people face de facto  the same, should they come
from very different socio-economic backgrounds.  Arneson attempted to deal with this
problem and others.
The notion of equal opportunity is often defined metaphorically by reference to
leveling the playing field.   What are the troughs  in the playing field of life that should be
leveled or filled in?  They are, I propose, the effects of disadvantageous circumstances
beyond the individual's control on his pursuit of welfare or well-being or life-plan
realization or self-realization.  Equal opportunity, I assert, requires that the effects of these
circumstances be neutralized, so that the outcome a person eventually achieves is due only to
his effort or autonomous choices, where autonomous choice is taken to circumscribe those
aspects of a person's behavior which are not  determined by circumstance.    Outcomes may
justifiably differ, if they are due only to differential effort or choice, but not if they are due
to differential circumstance.
To illustrate these ideas, I will next present an example.  I will then distill the key
theoretical concepts from the example.  Finally, I will attempt to use these concepts to
formulate, at least roughly,  the problem of equal opportunity for health.
2.  Equal opportunity for future earning power: an example
4
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I shall describe how to formulate a policy which equalizes opportunities, in a
population of youth, for future earning power.  To do so, I need to specify exactly what the
objective is, what constitute the relevant circumstances, how to measure the relevant effort,
and what instrument shall be used to carry out the opportunity equalization.  Our goal will
be as follows: To equalize, by use of the instrument,  opportunities for acquiring the
objective, in the sense that the degree of the objective acquired shall be sensitive only to a
person's effort and not to his circumstances.
The objective is, let us say, the wage or salary a person will be capable of earning at
some adult age, perhaps thirty.   I shall take the instrument to be education or, more
precisely, the amount of money that is spent in the public educational system on individuals.
The circumstances are those aspects of a person's situation which are beyond his control
and influence his achievement of adult earning power.
How might we choose these circumstances, if we were actually going to do carry out
this computation?  I would propose that we choose such characteristics as the socio-
economic status of the person's family, the level of education of his or her parents, the
person's race and sex, and perhaps some measure of the person's learning capacity, such as
IQ.  (We need not be concerned with the social determinants of IQ: they are, in any case,
also characteristics beyond the person's control, and so if IQ is in part determined by them,
that works in the right direction for us in this instance.)   We then partition the population in
question -- the society's young people -- into what I call types, where a type consists of all
persons with the same vector or list of circumstances.
How should we measure effort, the autonomous part of behavior?  Well, we might
choose something like the number of years of school the individual attended.  Clearly, there
is an element of social determination of this variable -- that is, the frequency distributions of
years of school attended will vary by type.   What we need to do is to factor out this social
determinant, so that we have a cleaner measure of autonomous choice.  I propose to do this
as follows.6
The frequency distributions of school years attended, will, as I said,  differ across
types.  More fortunate types will have 'better' distributions.  Now the frequency distribution
of years of school attended is a characteristic of the type, not of any individual.  Thus, a
person should not suffer, in the final analysis, from being in a type with a bad distribution
of effort.  We need some inter-type comparable measure of effort  which factors out, so to
speak,  the goodness or badness of distribution itself.  I propose that such a measure of
effort is the centile in the distribution of school years completed of his type at which the
individual sits.
To explain this choice, notice that, by definition, all individuals in a type have the
same circumstances.  Hence, if some in the type have worked hard and some not, that must
be due to autonomous volition
5.    We can say that a person in type A has tried harder than
another person in type A if the former attended 12 years of school, and the latter eight.  But
we cannot say that a white upper-middle class child in the US who attended school for
twelve years has tried harder than a black working-class child who attended school for eight
years: for doing so would not take into account the circumstantial determination of the
different distributions of school attendance in the two types.  Indeed, if the white and black
children just referred to each were at the 60% centile of the distribution of school attendance
in their respective types, I would say that they had each expended the same degree of effort.
(Thus, I distinguish between levels [absolute number of years of school attended] and
degrees of effort.)  The idea here is to calibrate a person’s degree effort by comparing his
effort to others with his circumstances.
I next must describe what, precisely, it means to equalize  the opportunities for the
objective in question.  This is the only tricky part to do without mathematical notation, but I
will try my best to present the basic idea in an accessible form.  I say that opportunities have
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been equalized when, at each centile of effort, the earning power, in the future, of all  persons
across types is (as close as possible to being) equal.  Thus, at the sixtieth centile of the
effort distributions, all individuals, regardless of their type, end up earning  (approximately)
the same wage
6.  Moreover, this must hold at all centiles.  It will be the case that those
persons at higher centiles of effort will earn more on average than those at lower centiles,
but it will not be the case that  two individuals at the same centile of their effort distributions,
but with different circumstances, earn different wages.  There is a way of formulating a
single objective, which when maximized, delivers a fairly good approximation to this ideal
7.
(The ideal, in fact, is mathematically unachievable,  so we must resort to what's called
second-best analysis.)
Now you can challenge this proposal in a variety of ways -- having to do with the
concept itself,  with the particular formulation of the various key terms (circumstances,
effort, instrument, objective), or in regard to the availability of suitable data to carry out the
project.   Before considering some challenges, let me review the qualitative nature of the
solution to the problem.  We would begin with a total educational budget for the society,
and I would take the instrument as the distribution of this budget among the different types.
In principle, I would wish to be able to distribute the budget in any way among the types.
The problem is to find that distribution of the budget that best fulfills the goal I've described,
It's important to understand that there is, given the data, exactly one solution to this problem.
There will be no ambiguity in what constitutes the opportunity-equalizing distribution of the
budget, once the terms of the problem are precisely specified.   The qualitative nature of the
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solution will be to spend more of the budget on disadvantaged types, but not to try to
equalize wages achieved across effort differentials within types.
On to some challenges, then.  One might say that IQ, or a perfect measure of inborn
intellectual capacity, if we had one, should not be included in the list of circumstances,
because it would be terribly wasteful to spend alot of resources trying to bring the wages of
innately untalented people up to wages of innately talented people.  My response: This is
not a challenge to the concept  I have put forth of equal opportunity ; it is rather, an assertion
that we should not try fully to equalize opportunities, because society has other values, as
well.   More generally, it is not obvious that society will or even should want fully to
equalize opportunities -- the cost in terms of the size of the national output, what's usually
called efficiency, may be too great.   A second challenge: If, in type A, Jill has attended 12
years of school and Jack only eight, it's not obvious that Jill tried harder.  Maybe she had a
mother who spent more time with her than Jack's did, and that's a circumstance, not taken
into account by the proposed definition of type.  My response:  Of course, we cannot
capture, in the list of circumstances, everything beyond a person's control which influences
the outcome she achieves.  Here, we are trying to formulate a social policy, which applies to
millions of people.  We can only proceed by making a list of the most important and
measurable circumstances.   Third challenge: If you delve deeply enough, everything a
person does is determined by circumstances beyond his control -- genes, pathways of
synaptic connections, details of family life, etc.  Hence, circumstance is everything, effort
nothing.  My response: Indeed, the logic of this challenge is that we should equalize
outcomes,  in this case, wages, for all.   As you can see, this challenge gets into the issue of
free will.  I cannot do justice to it here, but shall simply remark that every society has
conceptions of personal responsibility, whatever may be the metaphysical truth about free
will: it will wish to draw the line somewhere, and hold people responsible for their actions
above that line, so to speak.  In the algorithm I've been describing, that line is drawn once the
list of circumstances has been delineated.9
Let me give you a rough idea of what this theory produces in an actual application.
With my collaborator Julian Betts, a labor economist at UC San Diego,  I have computed
exactly what the distribution of the US education budget would have to be in order to
equalize opportunities for future earning power among American youth, where we take only
one  characteristic to comprise circumstance, the socio-economic status of the family the
child comes from
8.  We capture this status as the level of education of the more highly
educated parent.  We partitioned the universe of young men who comprise our sample into
four types; the most disadvantaged type grew up in families whose more highly educated
parent had less than nine years of schooling; the next type had parents who had more than
nine but fewer than twelve years; the next type had a parent who graduated from high school
only; and the most advantaged type had a parent with some tertiary education.   We used a
longitudinal data set, the National Longitudinal Study of Young Men (NLSYM), which has
tracked a group of young men for over thirty years.  Thus, it provides information on their
parents, on how much was spent per capita in the school district they attended, and on their
wages as young men.  From these data, we can compute the elasticity of future wages with
respect to educational investment, by type of child.  It turns out that, given an educational
budget of $2500 per capita, the equal-opportunity allocation of spending is given by Table
1, in which xI is the per capita educational expenditure on children of type i.
Table 1 EOp solutions,  Typology = { E1, E2, E3, E4}
E1 
 = parental education less than eight years
E2 = 8 < parental education < 12
E3 = parental education = 12
E4 = parental education > 12
r xE1 xE2 xE3 xE4 wEOp/wER
$2,500 $4,770 $3,030 $2,200 $530 1.024
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Table 1 says that we would have to spend about nine times as much per capita on the
education of the least advantaged type as on the education of the most advantaged type to
equalize opportunities for the acquisition of wage-earning capacity. The last column of the
table says that, were spending to be allocated in this way, average wages would increase by
2.4%, compared to what they would be if the same amount ($2500) were spent on all
children.  This is perhaps a surprise.
Once we have computed the equal-opportunity policy, we must consider what is
conceptually a completely different issue, but from the viewpoint of the policy maker is
equally important, namely: Is the equal-opportunity policy politically feasible,  would it be a
stable policy in the society in question?   To take the example just given, it would not, at this
point, be politically feasible in the United States to allocated spending as Table 1
recommends.   The US polity would probably eliminate public education, were that policy
instituted.    It is important to distinguish between what policy is desirable, from the Eop
viewpoint, and what policies are politically feasible.    In my view, it is useful to separate
these two exercises: first, to calculate the desirable policy, and then to consider how best to
approximate it, in the domain of politically feasible policies.
3.  Applying the theory to health: Part 1, the delivery of health care
It is not completely straightforward to apply the theory of equal opportunity to
health care: we have a great deal of latitude in choosing the objective, the circumstances, the
measure of effort or autonomous choice, and the instrument(s).  Space, and my limited
knowledge of medical care issues,  prevent me from a full discussion of the alternatives; I
shall attempt to outline only two proposals.
These correspond to two different problems one can address.  The first is, how
should health care be allocated and delivered in a population, once the budget exists?  This
problem does not concern itself with the allocation of the costs of delivering health care to
the population.  The second problem is, how should the costs of medical care be incident on11
the population, and how should the care be allocated and delivered?  Clearly, the second
problem is more complete, and  complex.  I will begin, in this section,  by addressing the
first problem; that is, I assume  that the budget exists, and financing is not an issue.  In the
next section, I will address the second problem.
What is the objective opportunities for which should be equalized?  This in itself is a
hard problem, but one I cannot focus upon here.  I propose that we equalize opportunities
for quality-adjusted years of life (QALYs).   I do not wish to debate the relative merits of
QALYs, DALYs, and other possible measures of good health status.  The reader may
substitute her favorite such measure here for QALYs.
What are the relevant circumstances?  Practicality requires that we choose a short list
of circumstances.   For a start, we could partition the population into types, based upon their
education and occupation, for example.   If we do so, then we are saying that we want to
equalize QALYs across these socio-economic types, at given degrees of ‘effort.’  This
raises an important point.  Earlier, I said that circumstances should be aspects of the
person’s environment that influence the outcome in question, and that are beyond his
control, or that we wish not to hold him accountable for.   The education and occupation of
a person are consequences both of things beyond his control, and of choices that he has
made that we may wish to view as autonomous.   So I justify defining circumstances as
education-occupation status   here not because a person’s education and occupation are
beyond his control, but rather because I propose that we do not want to hold a person
accountable for the effect on his eventual health (QALYs) of his education and occupational
choices.   This is a ethical view that one could challenge.
What is the effort variable?  I think it is  life-style quality, the choices individuals
make that effect their health status: whether or not they smoke, the fat content of their diet,
their sexual behavior, etc.   Clearly,  within each type -- that is, each cohort as defined by the
education- occupation vector -- there will be a distribution of good and bad life-styles, with
these adjectives not implying any moral judgment, but simply, their consequences for health.12
Recall, from the education example, that we will be concerned with the distributions of
effort, here life-style quality, in each type.  To the extent that these distributions differ across
types, individuals within them will not be held responsible.
What is the instrument? Here, there is much room for choice, and the attractiveness
of the policy we eventually recommend may well depend on that choice.    I propose that the
instrument be a vector of expenditures on disease occurrences: that is, a vector (x1, …, xn),
where society will spend xI on treatment of an occurrence of disease i in an individual.
This defines completely the parameters of the problem.  The key data that are
needed to calculate the EOp policy are the frequencies of disease occurrence by type in the
population, and the effect on QALYs of spending given amounts on treatments of given
diseases.  The task is to find the vector of disease expenditures, which is feasible given the
budget and the type-incidence of diseases in the population, that maximizes our equal-
opportunity objective.
This instrument will only be effective in equalizing opportunities for QALYs if the
frequencies of the major disease categories differ across types.  Let us take a very simple
example.  Suppose there are two types, poor and rich, and two diseases,  tuberculosis and
cancer.  The poor contract  (and die) mainly (of) tuberculosis and the rich, mainly (of)
cancer.  The rich, at present, have a much greater number of QALYs at each centile of the
effort distribution.  The EOp policy will be to spend a lot on tuberculosis and little on
cancer.  Clearly, if the relative frequency of the two diseases were the same in the two types,
this instrument would not permit us to equalize opportunities for QALYs in the population.
In that case, we would have to choose another instrument, such as the amount to be spent on
the occurrence of an episode of a disease by type.
Before commenting more specifically on the EOp solution, let me note that this
proposal implements the policy of Health for All, advocated by WHO.   In describing the
concept of equity upon which that policy is based, Margaret Whitehead writes that the
results of 'health-damaging behavior if freely chosen, such as participation in certain sports13
and pastimes,' should not be considered to constitute an inequity
9.  This is exactly my thesis
about  the role of autonomous volition's effect on health status.  She further elaborates:
Judgments on which situations are unfair will vary from place to place and from 
time to time, but one widely used criterion is the degree of choice  involved.Where 
people have little or no choice of living and working conditions, the resulting health 
differences are more likely to be considered unjust than those resulting from health 
risks that were chosen voluntarily. [Emphasis in original]
And, using our terminology, Whitehead states:
Equity is therefore concerned with creating equal opportunities  for health, and with 
bringing health differentials down to the lowest possible level. [Emphasis in 
original]
 Now Whitehead, and WHO, have chosen a relatively uncontentious example -- namely,
dangerous sport -- to illustrate the point about autonomous volition.  But exactly the same
reasoning applies to harder examples, like smoking and lung cancer.  If we decide that a
person has 'freely chosen' to smoke, then that person is not presumed, under our theory, to
have the same rights with respect to public compensation for the treatment of his ensuing
disease as one who acquires lung cancer while having chosen to live healthily.   And how do
we decide how responsible a person is for his smoking behavior (unhealthful life style)?
By seeing at what centile of the life-style quality frequency distribution of his type he sits.
(I am here thinking of health policy in an advanced industrial society, where the effects of
smoking are popularly known.  It would not be appropriate to hold people responsible for
an unhealthful behavior if they cannot be expected to know that it is unhealthful.)  Thus, a
person will not be held responsible for smoking, if smoking is ubiquitous among his type.
Coal miners, if smoking is prevalent among them, would not be held responsible for that
unhealthful behavior, while a smoking college professor, most of whose occupational co-
workers do not smoke, would be.
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I shall next illustrate the EOp solution by constructing a specific example of the
tuberculosis-cancer story.    The poor have life-styles whose qualities are uniformly
distributed on the interval [0,1], while the rich have life-style qualities that are uniformly
distributed on the interval [0.5, 1.5].  The probability of contracting the disease, as a
function of life-style quality (e)
r
C(e) = 1 – 2e/3 for both types,
r
T(e) = 1 – e/3 for the poor.
(The rich do not contract tuberculosis at all.
Suppose that life expectancy for a rich individual is given by




 if cancer is contracted, and xc is spent on its treatment.
Thus, if the disease is contracted, life expectancy will lie between 50 and 70, depending on
how much is spent on treatment (from zero to an infinite amount).    (This is a simple of
modeling the fact that no body dies of cancer before age 50.)
Suppose that life expectancy for a poor individual is




 if cancer is contracted and xc is spent on its treatment,
and 50 + 20
.1xt -1
.1xt +1
 if tuberculosis is contracted and xt is spent on its treatment.
Thus, the poor can die at age 30 if they contract TB and nothing it is not treated.  With large
expenditures, a person who contracts TB can live to  age 70.  Furthermore, it is expensive to
raise life expectancy above 30 if TB is contracted .  I further assume that if a poor person
contracts both cancer and TB then her life expectancy will be the minimum of the the above
two numbers.
Finally, I assume that 25% of the population is poor and 75% are rich, and that the
national health budget is $3000 per capita.15
With these data, one can compute that 33% of the rich will contract cancer, 9.3% of
the poor will contract only cancer, 26% of the poor will contract only TB, and 57% of the
poor will contract both TB and cancer.
Our instrument is (xc,xt), the schedule of how much will spent on treating an
occurrence of each disease.  The objective is to equalize opportunities, for the rich and the
poor, for life expectancy.
The calculation of the optimal solution is presented in the Appendix.  The solution is
xc = $250, xt=$13,900.  In Figure 1, I present the life expectancies of the rich and the poor,
as a function of the percentile at which they sit on the effort distribution of their type, at this
solution.
Figure 1
We see that, at the EOp solution, the rich still have substantially greater life expectancy than
the poor – despite the large amounts being spent on treating tuberculosis.   Moreover, life
expectancy increases significantly with life-style quality – this is an aspect that EOp does
not attempt to eliminate.
Let us compare this solution to the utilitarian solution, which is the expenditure
schedule at which (average) life expectancy in the population as a whole is maximized.  The









solution turns out to be xc = $2520, xt=$9,350.  Ten times as much as spent on cancer as in
the EOp solutio.  Figure 2 graphs the life expectancy of the two types in the utilitarian
solution (light lines) as well as the EOp solution (heavy lines):
Figure 2
We see that the utilitarian solution narrows the life-expectancy differential between the types
a good deal less than does the EOp solution.
It should be remarked that the distribution of life expectancies across types will be
more differentiated in a society with private financing of medical care.  For even in our
utilitarian solution, the same amount is expended on treating the occurrence of a disease in a
person, regardless of his type.  That is not the case in a private system, where more is spent
on treatment of given diseases in rich people than in poor people.  In the United States, the
utilitarian solution would surely be more just than what we observe.  In particular, the
utilitarian solution would perform better with regard to equalizing opportunities for QALYs
than does the present system.







The reader may be surprised that the EOp solution does not narrow the type
differential of life expectancies more than it does.  This is because of our choice of
instrument.  Note that an occurrence of a disease (in this case, only cancer) in either type
receives the same treatment.  If we were willing to spend more on treating cancer in poor
individuals than in rich individuals, then the life-expectancy differential between types could
be narrowed much more.  But this would violate what is perhaps another social norm, that of
horizontal equity, that the treatment an individual receives should be independent of his type,
once the disease is contracted.  Thus, my choice of instrument in the example was a
compromise, trading off equal opportunity with horizontal equity.
Before proceeding, I want to reconsider a comment I made earlier, that we might
want to include sex in the list of circumstances.  In many parts of the world, this would be a
good thing-- it would serve to shift medical resources to women, who are receiving fewer of
them than they should.  It must be remarked, however, that in the advanced countries, this
may not be the correct approach.   In all advanced countries, life expectancy is greater for
women than for men; if we included sex in the list of circumstances, the effect would be to
shift medical resources from women to men, in an effort to equalize their QALYs which, in
particular, would involve equalizing their life expectancies!  This point has recently been
discussed by  John Kekes, in the context of a Rawlsian theory of health care.
10  It is
pertinent to note that WHO, in its definition of equity, specifically excepts differences in
health status due to natural, biological variation, from the list of inequities in health.  The
issue of male-female life expectancy may well be a case in point.  If having a shorter life is a
biological attribute of maleness, normal and ubiquitous in the species, then trying to equalize
life expectancies across the sexes is not necessary to equalize opportunities for health.  On
the other hand, if shorter male life spans are due to greater occupational stresses, and so on,
then it would be appropriate to include sex as a component of circumstance.
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Finally, I wish to observe that what I've solved here can be called the micro-
allocation problem.   There are other policies, which the society should activate, whose
purpose is to improve the distributions of life-style quality in the various types: education
about health, subsidizing healthy practices, outlawing the advertising of tobacco, etc.  I call
this the macro-allocation problem.  Often, the macro-allocation problem is associated with
prevention.  Society clearly should spend a certain fraction of its health care budget not in
treating diseases once they occur, but in improving life-style qualities of its citizens.  This
means not only changing behavior, but legislating against unhealthful working conditions,
food and drug regulations, and so on.  This is, as it stands, a trite statement: what is perhaps
less trite is to remark that these 'macro' expenditures can be evaluated using the EOp tool.
We allocate dollars to improving life-style qualities to the extent that that allocation is
effective in increasing the value of our equal-opportunity objective.
4.  Applying the theory to health: Part 2, The delivery of health care and the allocation of
costs
The full analysis of equity in health care requires not only solving the delivery of
health care problem, but solving the allocation of cost problem, as well.  It would be
convenient if we could solve these two problems separately
11.  Having solved the first one
above, we could now analyze separately the problem of cost allocation.  Unfortunately, this
is not the correct way to proceed.   Conceptual clarity requires that we solve the two
problems simultaneously.  This analysis is naturally more difficult than what we have just
gone through.  Our task now is to find not only the optimal disease expenditure vector, but
the total amount of the health budget, and its allocation among citizens.
                                                
11 In the literature, the two problems are often dealt with separately.  See, for instance, the two papers by
van Doorslaer and Wagstaff.  This first, referred to earlier, discusses only the problem of health care
delivery.  The second is "Equity in the finance of health care: Some international comparisons," Journal of
Health Economics 11, 1992,: 361-38719
To simplify  our analysis, I will assume that society has decided upon the total
amount of the health-care budget, what fraction of GNP should be spent on health care. We
must solve, then, for both the disease- expenditure vector and the allocation of costs across
individuals.
Here again we have many alternatives.   The budget for medical care could be raised
through insurance premiums or income taxation or consumption taxes (e.g., on tobacco,
alcohol, and fat content of foods).  We could, more generally, use all three methods.  I
cannot discuss all the possibilities.   I shall use income taxation as the method, for the sake
of simplicity, although I might well advocate a mixture of the three methods in actual
practice.  During this discussion, it is important to recall that I am separating the issues of
what the equal-opportunity policy is , and what policy is politically feasible and stable.  For
the moment, I ignore the issue of political stability, but shall return to it later.
We must first consider what the objective is.  We can no longer define it, simply,  as
QALYs, for we must also consider the costs to the individual of paying his share of the
health budget, whatever we decide that is.  These costs should be measured in units
comparable to QALYs.  Thus, we should think of the cost an individual incurs by paying
$1,000 for health care in a year as a welfare  cost to her.  Let us say, to approximate, that her
welfare cost is c  units per dollar paid.  Then the new objective would be:
her QALYs  minus c  times her health care expenditure.
The number c   will be larger, the lower is the individual's income.  A poor person, that is to
say, incurs a larger welfare cost from spending $1,000 on health care than a rich person
does.  So to define our new objective precisely, we need to decide upon the values of c  for
each level of income in society.   I will have nothing further to say about how to calculate
these numbers.
Next, to the instrument.  I have arbitrarily chosen this to be income taxation.  Ideally,
we would like to be able to tax a person based not only on his income but on his other20
relevant characteristics: his education, occupation, age, and life-style quality.  It would,
however, be very difficult to collect taxes based on life-style quality, so we will have to settle
for taxes based, let us say, on education, occupation, age, and income.  The income tax form
would require a person to report these data.    Our full instrument is the disease  expenditure
vector and the tax schedule, which specifies the tax a person pays as a function of her
income and type.   In the simplest case, we use a pure income tax, which predicates the tax
only on income.  But I will assume that to some extent we can also predicate the tax on type;
that is, the tax schedules may differ across types, as in the US, where disabled people
receive some tax credits.  As before, there will be an optimal solution to the EOp problem,
subject to the constraint that the revenues collected equal the budget, whose value I took,
above, to be set.
Let me comment upon the solution.  The higher the value of c  for an income class,
the less members of that income class will tend to pay in health taxes.  Thus, the rich, other
things equal, will pay more than the poor.  Taxes will also tend to be larger for members of
types that have good life-style quality distributions: that is, health-care taxation will
effectively subsidize types who have bad life-style-quality distributions.  Since no
individual, however, will report her life-style practices, those with less healthful practices will
not be taxed more.   As in the example of the last section, welfare will increase with life-style
quality in both types.
There is a contentious aspect of the solution that should be mentioned.  In the
previous section, the objective of our equal opportunity problem was QALYs; here it is a
more general conception of welfare.   While it may be within the jurisdiction of the Health
Ministry to equalize opportunities for QALYs, it is not within their jurisdiction to equalize
opportunities for overall welfare.   The citizenry may well accept the view that opportunities
for QALYs should be equalized, but not accept the view that opportunities for a more
pervasive kind of welfare should also be equalized.   Moreover, even in this section, we have
taken the health budget as given.   That budget, too, would at some point be endogenous, in21
the sense of emerging from a pervasive computation that seeks to equalize opportunities for
overall welfare of citizens.   Nevertheless, we need not endorse that pervasive a jurisdiction
for the equal-opportunity ethic to agree to the attractiveness of equzalizing opportunities for
QALYs,  independent of the size of the health care budget and its method of financing.
It is time to consider the political stability of the proposed solution.  Since wealthy
individuals with high education (advantaged types) will  pay more into the health care
budget than poor, poorly educated persons, the solution is vulnerable to a political rebellion
by the well-off.   If this is indeed a danger, then we must search for the solution which is
closest to the correct solution that we calculate and  is politically stable.  This might mean
that we simply fund health care out of general revenues, and do not ask taxpayers to report
their type.  The rich, under this regime, will subsidize the poor, but the subsidy will not be
perfectly in line with what equal opportunity requires.  As earlier, the choice of instrument
represents a compromise between equalizing opportunities and political feasibility.
Similar remarks apply to the choice of an insurance mechanism versus a tax
mechanism.   From the point of view of implementing equality of opportunity for health,
both mechanisms can do a good job.  The more information we are able to collect on
individuals, with regard to their type and effort, the closer will the calculated solutions be to
the ideal equal-opportunity regime.  The choice between these financing mechanisms is
predicated mainly on political criteria.   General taxation is often viewed as being a more
politically stable way of financing national social security programs than insurance.  It must
be noted that when I speak of insurance, I do not mean competitive insurance priced by
profit-making firms.  We, the Ministry of Health, would solve the insurance problem to
maximize not profits but our equal-opportunity objective.   For this reason, from the ethical
viewpoint, there is no reason to prefer funding out of general revenues over funding via a
separate social insurance procedure.  The differences, as I said, only appear when political
considerations are taken into account.22
Finally, as I said earlier, there is yet a third source of funding:  consumption taxes.
The principle would be to tax consumption of unhealthful  commodities.  This principle,
however, is in general more regressive than income taxation and insurance, since all
individuals, regardless of income, would pay the same tax for consuming the commodities
in question.  Nevertheless, using taxes on tobacco to fund health care may be one of the
more popular methods of financing in some countries.  And taxing unhealthful commodities
will also serve to reduce their consumption, which is to say, to improve society's distribution
of life-style quality.
5.  Conclusion
 Let me review some of the key points of the analysis.
1.  First and foremost, contemporary egalitarian theory has carved out an important place
for personal responsibility.  In intellectual and political history, individual responsibility
was uniquely the province of the political right.  In the last twenty-five years, the left has
recognized the salience of responsibility for its social theory, as well, as I have tried to
outline. This has, I think, produced a theory of equality that is consonant with the basic
intuitions that most people have.  Those intuitions are that, to the extent that risks are
freely chosen, resulting inequalities of condition are not unjust.  To articulate this
properly, however, requires a view about responsibility.
One should note that, unlike the utilitarian and full-egalitarian
12 recommendations,
the EOp solution is not consequentialist.  That is, the utilitarian and full egalitarian
solution can be computed without knowing the efforts expended by individuals – they
take as mathematical arguments only the profile of life expectancies in the population.
The EOp solution, in contrast, requires knowledge not only of the profile of life
expectancies, but of the effort profile, and the types of individuals.  Informally speaking,
                                                
12 By which I mean the solution that maximizes the minimum life expectancy in the population,
sometimes called the Rawlsian solution.23
to equalize opportunities requires how hard individuals have tried, not only how much
they have achieved.
2. The equal-opportunity view that I have espoused is consonant with the view of
equity espoused by the WHO.  There are some contentious aspects of the equal-
opportunity ethic.   For instance,  the fact, if it is one,  that some people who smoke chose
'more freely' to do so than others who smoke, means that, according to the equal-
opportunity view, they are owed less compensation by society for the damage to their health
than those others are.
This view will doubtless raise objections from many health policy makers, who will
see it as leading to an ethically unacceptable assignment of costs to individual, rather than to
social, accounts.   Let me, therefore, reiterate the argument.  I assert there is a fact of the
matter, in regard to a person's responsibility for her smoking behavior.  The fact of the
matter may be that no one should be held accountable for her smoking behavior: this would
be so if, for instance, the decision to smoke is made before the 'age of consent' (the age at
which we deem persons to be responsible for their behavior), is induced by social forces
such as pernicious advertising of tobacco companies, and that, once hooked, a person's
smoking is an addiction, the escape from which depends not on acts of autonomous volition,
but on the person's 'biological circumstances.'  Something like this view is, indeed, held by
many people who are experts on tobacco and health policy.   If this were the case, then a
person's smoking behavior – more generally, her life-style quality--  would be, in our theory,
considered a circumstance, not an assemblage of acts of autonomous volition.  The
consequence would be that no one would be penalized for smoking.
However, the fact of the matter may well be different: it may be that, to some extent,
individuals are capable, as adults, of moderating their smoking behavior, and that we deem
that whether or not they do so is not entirely a matter of circumstance.  We may  decide, that
is, that the decision a person makes in regard to the intensity of his smoking is, once the24
circumstances that define type have been accounted for, as voluntary as his decision whether
or not to drive a motor cycle or skydive off cliffs.  In that case, there's no reason to hold him
less accountable for his smoking behavior than for his skydiving behavior.
Indeed, many health policy makers who take the view that smoking is an addiction
beyond the person's control also advocate 'sin taxes' on tobacco.  The simultaneous
advocacy of these two positions is, I think,  inconsistent.  On the one hand, if smoking is
entirely beyond the control of individuals, then there is certainly no ethical justification
(from an equal-opportunity perspective) in taxing them for the behavior.  On the other hand,
if the justification for such taxation is that it will reduce smoking, that is an admission that
the behavior is not entirely beyond the control of individuals.
3.   While health-care professionals and health-care ethicists make decisions daily, and
episodically,  in which they ration health care in one way or another, I have taken certain
general principles of distributive justice and asked what allocation of health care and
incidence of its costs they lead to, if applied in an all-encompassing way to a society.  With
the disease-expenditure vector as instrument, health expenditures on diseases of advantaged
types are rationed, relative to what would be spent on them in either an unregulated market
system, or even under a ‘utilitarian’ ethic.
4.     I further observed that conceptually, it is not correct to separate the delivery of health
care decision from the financing decision.  Of course, approximations to the ideal equal-
opportunity solution can be arrived at by treating the two problems separately, and the
manner in which a government decentralizes its activities may require separating the solution
of these problems to some extent, in practice.
5.  I remarked often upon the importance -- again conceptually -- of separating the question
of what constitutes the equal-opportunity solution to the health-care problem from the
question of what solutions are politically feasible or stable.   The proper formulation of the
problem is: we seek the solution which maximizes the degree of equality of opportunity for25
health in society subject to the constraint that the solution be politically stable.   Often, I
think, this conceptual clarity is absent in the literature.   I assert there is a value to
understanding what the ethically ideal solution to the problem is, were there no political
constraints.  It is then proper to ask what compromises must be admitted for the sake of
political tractability.  An example is that it would be ideal, were we able to tax people, or
charge them insurance premiums, based on their circumstances and the quality of their life-
style.  Doing so, however, would almost certainly not be politically feasible.  Therefore, we
must compromise and not use all the information that it would be nice to be able to use.
What I have proposed here would doubtless be altered by experiment,  by actually
trying it out.  The above can be only a rough glimpse of what an equal-opportunity health
policy would eventually look like.26
Appendix
This appendix solves the EOp problem for the example of section 3.  The notation
below follows that or Roemer(1998).
We must first define the life-expectancy functions of the individuals in the two
types.  Converting from absolute efforts to centiles of effort, the probability that a rich
person at centile p of his effort distribution contracts cancer is 1-2(p+.5)/3; the probability
that a poor person contracts cancer is 1-2p/3; the probability that a poor person contracts
tuberculosis is 1-p/3; the probability that a poor person contracts both diseases is (1-2p/3)
















































R be the fraction of the Rich who contract cancer,  q
R and q
P be the fraction of Rich








We easily compute from the data the various fractions of types who contract diseases.








We use the budget constraint to express xc  in terms of xt,  thus reducing the optimization to
a one dimensional problem.  Graphing the functions v
P and v
R for various values of xt, we27
see that the v
P function lies always entirely below the v







The solution is readily found by simulation.









the solution is easily found by simulation.28